The first and principal paragraph of this entry is taken (with some variations and omissions) from Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries on Aristotle's Topica 103.30-104.28, which is commenting on Aristotle, Topica 106b29ff.
[1] The Greek is e)/gklisis, 'declension', 'inflection' or 'any derivative form', such as the mood of a verb. See Apollonius Dyscolus, Syntax 248.14, and especially Dionysius Thrax, Grammar 1.1.48-53. The latter interestingly maintains that the verb (r(h=ma) is accompanied by: (1) eight 'moods' (e)gkli/seis): the verbal moods themselves, which are divided into (a) indicative (o(ristikh/) (b) imperative (prostaktikh/), (c) optative (eu)ktikh/), (d) subjunctive (u(potaktikh/), and (e) infinitive (a)pare/mfatos); (2) dispositions (diaqe/seis), which are divided into: (a) active (e)ne/rgeia): 'I beat'; (b) passive (pa/qos): 'I am beaten', and (c) middle (voice) (meso/ths): 'I have fixed in/on' (peph/ga), 'I made/created' (e)poihsa/mhn), 'I wrote' (e)graya/mhn); (3) forms or types (ei)/dh): prototype (prwto/typon) like 'I furnish drink for' a)/rdw and derivative (para/gwgon) like a)rdeu/w; (4) figures (sxh/mata), which can be simple, compound, or formed from a compound; (5) numbers, which can be singular ('I beat'), dual ('both of you beat'), and plural ('we beat'); (6) persons: first, second, third; (7) times: present, past, future; (8) conjugations.
[2] The examples of ptw=sis that can be found in Aristotle are both nominal inflections ("'Philo's' or 'to Philo', and all those things that are of this sort are not names [o)no/mata], but inflections [ptw/seis] of a name"; De interpretatione 16a32-16b1) and verbal inflections ("Every declarative enunciation must exist out of a verb or out of its inflection. For even the enunciation of man is not yet a declarative enunciation unless 'is' or 'will be' or 'was' or something of this sort is added"; De interpretatione 17a9-12). For Aristotle an 'inflection' is any set of forms derived from the same lexeme. In Topica 114a33ff Aristotle says that inflections are things like 'justly', 'courageously', 'healthily', and such as are said in this way. He also adds that the forms that correspond to inflections are 'coordinates'; for example, 'justly' is coordinate in relation to justice, 'courageously' in relation to courage, and so on (Topica 114a34-36).
[3] According to Aristotle, things that get their names from something but differ in their inflection are called 'derivative' [paronu/mous]; for instance, the grammarian gets his name from 'grammar', the courageous person gets his name from 'courage' (see Categories 1a12-15).
[4] By 'coordinates' (su/stoixa) Aristotle means things such as the following: just actions and the just person are coordinate with 'justice', courageous actions and the courageous person are coordinate with courage (Topica 114a27-29).
[5] Alexander's text (104.13-14) reads "Inflections are those things that are particularly configured thus [rather than 'not'] along with [other] things, such 'grammatically'", which makes a better sense.
[6] This is so, Aristotle says, because according to each person who acts 'justly' there will be a just person (Topica 106b31).
[7] For this expression in Aristotle, see Topica 109b25; 115a33; b17.
[8] Likewise or similarly in other lexica; references at Photius pi1495, where Theodoridis tentatively follows Naber's view that this participle is quoted from Homer, Iliad 7.129. However, it is masculine accusative plural there; for a nominative see a phrase of Tyrtaeus (fr.11.36) preserved in Stobaeus.
[9] Greek Anthology 7.193.1-2 = Sim(m)ias of Rhodes (sigma 431) fr.19 Powell. Reading with Powell th/nde for pa=n de/ and dri/os for druo/s produces a more satisfactory translation: "walking through this well-wooded grove I drew it out ...". On this epigram, a recollection of capturing a grasshopper (or a locust), see also Gow and Page (vol. I, 178), (vol. II, 512), and another extract at epsilon 3441.