From the writings of Plotinus. [Pleasures,] pains, recklessness, fears, desires, aversions, and feeling pain of mind, to what do they belong? For they belong either to the soul or the soul making use of the body or a third thing composed of both. This latter can be understood in two senses, too: for it is either a mixture or some other thing resulting from a mixture.[1]
Definitions of pleasure: i, a smooth movement; or ii, a perceptible process of generation toward nature; or iii, an irrational relaxation; or iv, an unhindered activity of the natural condition;[2] or v, the end which follows the completed activities. Taking these definitions as a starting point, one is able to support and to refute the thesis [...] that pleasure [is] a good and that [it is] not.
Pleasure is a smooth movement but distress is a rough movement; and while the former is well-pleasing for every animal, the latter is repellent. They say that the bodily pleasure that is also an end, is not a pleasure pertaining to a state, the one consisting of taking away of pains of mind, such as freedom from disturbance; they say that bodily pleasure is also an end.[3] The end is different from happiness, for the end is particular pleasure but the structure consisting of particular pleasures with which we measure past and future pleasures, is happiness.[4]
And particular pleasure is worth choosing by itself, but happiness is not worth choosing by itself but by particular pleasures. Pleasure is an irrational elation over what seems to be worth choosing.[5] Under it are arranged fascination, joy at another's misfortune, enjoyment, relaxation. Now fascination is a pleasure which fascinates one through one's hearing sense.[6] Joy at another's misfortune is a pleasure at someone else's bad things;[7] enjoyment [te/ryis], as a turning [tre/yis], is a certain conversion of the soul towards the dissolute; relaxation is the dissolving of virtue.[8]
There is an acknowledged syllogistic argument of the contradictory position concerning each part "of the thesis whether pleasure is a good or is not a good". The following syllogistic argument shows that pleasure is a good: the good is that at which all things aim.[9] All things aim at pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is good. On the contrary, the argument that shows that pleasure is not a good is the following: the good makes men good. Pleasure does not make men good. Therefore, pleasure is not a good.[10] In fact, pleasure is a smooth movement, but every movement is an incomplete activity.[11] However, no good is incomplete. Consequently, pleasure [is] not a good.