cf. delta 556, delta 557, delta 558.
[1] The identification of sciences (or “forms of knowledge”; e)pisth=mai) and arts (or “technical skills”; te/xnai) with dispositions and virtues sounds Stoic in character (cf. Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.63.6-7, 2.67.5-12, and especially 2.70.21-71, 6, ed. Wachsmuth). Like the Platonic Socrates, the Stoics were willing to accept the thesis that virtue is a form of knowledge and they added (probably having Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in mind) that virtue is a “disposition”, or rather “a consistent disposition of the commanding part of the soul” (Plutarch, Moralia 441C-D; Diogenes Laertius 7.89; alpha 3830). However, unlike Aristotle, for the Stoics the more stable is the disposition (dia/qesis), not the state (e(/cis). For evidence, see Simplicius, On Aristotle's Categories 237.25-238.20; Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.71.1-2, ed. Wachsmuth.
[2] Aristotle, unlike Socrates and Plato who make an indistinct use of the terms “art” and “science”, clearly distinguishes both words. According to Aristotle, art and science are two different intellectual virtues having two different objects: science or what one knows scientifically does not admit of being otherwise and is a supposition about universals, i.e. its object is that which cannot be otherwise (see Nicomachean Ethics 1139b20-24; 1140b31-32). By contrast, art is that which can be otherwise and is concerned with coming to be (Nicomachean Ethics 1140a10-15, 20-23).
[3] Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries on Aristotle's Topica 158.24-29.
[4] For what follows cf. John of Damascus PG 94.633bc.
[5] Aristotle, Categories 8b35-9a4, more or less directly quoted, from "Those things" to "now call a 'state.'" See web address 1.
[6] cf. epsilon 1767 (end). This is Aristotle’s position: see Categories 8b26. English "disposition" and "state" do not represent adequately the impermanence of a dia/qesis or the persistence of a e(/cis.