[It is] a knowledge of what one should choose and what one should beware of and [what is] neither of them.[1]
Now justice [is] the common virtue, the [virtue] that is opposed to the other virtues equivocally. But courage and justice differ, although being of the same genus [and being ranged] under the same genus, virtue. For instance, in one sense courage is a mean, in another sense justice, for [the former is a mean between] two vices, boldness and cowardice, while [the former is a mean between] excess and defect, out of which injustice [arises]. In fact, the being of injustice [consists] in these. And courage is concerned with some things, for [courage] relates to the endurance of dangers; and justice is concerned with other things, for [justice] relates to what is equal, both in distribution and in agreements. Thus [these] also are of the same genus.